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Introduction
In many societies the egalitarianism is a desirable end and is considered as a social value. However, what "egalitarianism"means for each individual or society can be di¤erent. In this sense, in the context of cooperative game theory the concept of egalitarianism has generated several so-called egalitarian solutions. For example, for arbitrary cooperative games, the equal division core (Selten, 1972) , the constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1 1989 ), the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991) , the egalitarian set, the preegalitarian set and the stable egalitarian set (Arin and Inarra, 2002 ) and the equal split-o¤ set (Branzei et al., 2006) . Dutta and Ray (1989) combined the Lorenzian concept of inequality 1 and the values for each coalition in a cooperative game to introduce the constrained egalitarian solution. They introduced the Lorenz map to select the non Lorenz dominated allocations of a given set. Thus, using this Lorenz map and a principle similar to that behind of the de…nition of the equal division core (Selten, 1972) , they de…ned the Lorenz core of a game through a recursive procedure and the result of applying the Lorenz map on the Lorenz core is called the set of constrained egalitarian solutions which contains at most one allocation. Likewise, Dutta and Ray (1989) provided an algorithm to …nd the constrained egalitarian solution for convex games. Indeed, for general games, when this algorithm gives an allocation in the Lorenz core then it coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution. Based on this algorithm, Branzei et al (2006) introduced the equal split-o¤ set for cooperative games which is contained in the equal division core for superadditive games and coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution for convex games. Furthermore, for convex games, the constrained egalitarian solution belongs to the core of the game and Lorenz dominates every other allocation in the core (Dutta and Ray, 1989 ). The allocation obtained by the algorithm, when exists, does not always coincide with the constrained egalitarian solution. In this paper we provide some technical results related to the Lorenz dominance in cooperative games which allow to prove that the allocation obtained by the algorithm, when exists, always Lorenz dominates every core allocation. Likewise, these results allow to prove that every allocation in the equal split-o¤ set also Lorenz dominates every allocation in the core of the game. On the other hand, if we consider that minimal requirements of an allocation are the e¢ ciency and the individual rationality, i.e., to belong to the imputation set, then these technical results provide insights about the structure of the less unequal allocations in the imputation set of the game in the Lorenzian sense.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide the basic de…nitions, concepts and solutions of cooperative games used along the paper. Section 3 is devoted to an example from Dutta and Ray (1989) which is useful to illustrate some aspects mentioned in the Introduction. Section 4 is the main part of the paper, where we prove some technical results related to the Lorenz dominance. In Section 5 we conclude and discuss some implications of the technical results with regards to cooperative games.
Preliminaries
A transferable utility cooperative game (TU-game in short) is de…ned by a pair (N; v) , where N = f1; 2; :::; ng is a …nite set of players or agents and v, called the characteristic function, is a map from the set of all possible subsets of N to R, such that v(;) = 0. For each coalition S, v(S) represents what the players in S can obtain if they cooperate.
Depending on the properties of the characteristic function we have di¤er-ent classes of games. Two relevant classes of games are the following:
Given a game (N; v) an allocation or distribution for it is a vector x 2 R n . We will denote by x(S) = P i2S x i . An allocation is called e¢ cient if On the other hand, let (x (1) ; x (2) ; :::; x (n) ) be the vector obtained from x 2 R n by ordering its components in decreasing order: x (1) x (2) ::: x (n) . Given two vectors x; y 2 R n with
for each k = 1; 2; :::; n, with at least one strict inequality. Based in this concept we can consider two additional sets introduced by Dutta and Ray (1989) , the Lorenz core (L(N; v)) and the set of egalitarian allocations (EL(N; v)).
The Lorenz core and the set of egalitarian allocations are de…ned iteratively in the cardinality of the coalitions in the following way:
General step: L(S; v) = fx 2 R jSj : x(S) = v(S), and @T ( S and y 2 EL(T; v) such that y i x i for all i 2 T with at least one strict 3 inequalityg, where
for each k = 1; 2; :::; jT j, with at least one strict inequalityg.
The …nal result of the described recursive procedure are precisely L(N; v) and EL(N; v). In Dutta and Ray (1989) it is proved that EL(N; v) contains at most one allocation and this is called the constrained egalitarian solution (CES(N; v)). Furthermore, Dutta and Ray (1989) provided the following algorithm to compute the constrained egalitarian solution for convex games:
Step 1:
Step k: Let us assume that S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k 1 have been de…ned recursively and
De…ne the game with set of player N n
. De…ne
This algorithm always ends in a …nite number of iterations, and we will denote x by DR(N; v). It is clear that for convex games DR(N; v) = CES(N; v), but this is not true in general. Furthermore, in general, S k could not be unique, in that case we could obtain more than one allocation and there would be more than one DR(N; v). Thus, in a general sense, DR(N; v) could be considered a set of allocations.
Following the scheme of the Dutta and Ray algorithm, Branzei et al (2006) de…ned the equal split-o¤ set (ESOS(N; v)). For each partition = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S K g of N such that S k 2 arg max S N n
, k = 1; 2; :::; K, they consider the allocation x given by
for all S k 2 and all i 2 S k . Given a game (N; v), the equal spli-o¤ set is given by
Clearly, in general, there are more than one partition in the described conditions, therefore ESOS(N; v) could contain more than one allocation. In Branzei et al (2006) it is proved that ESOS(N; v) coincides with CES(N; v) for convex games. Finally, it is straightforward that DR(N; v) ESOS(N; v).
An example
In this section we are going to analyze Example 4 in Dutta and Ray (1989) . This example was used to illustrate that the egalitarian allocation does not Lorenz dominate all core allocations when the game is not convex. Example 1 (Dutta and Ray, 1989) 
The constrained egalitarian allocation is CES(N; v) = (1; 2; 3; 4) and belongs to the core of the game, but it does not Lorenz dominate the allocation (1
) which is also in the core. However, the allocation obtained by the Dutta and Ray algorithm is DR(N; v) = (1 Therefore this example suggests the following questions: Does the allocation obtained by the algorithm, when exists, Lorenz dominate every core allocation? The answer is positive and one proof of that is obtained using the technical results in the next section.
Technical results
In this section we provide some technical results related to Lorenz dominance which could be useful to analyze the Lorenz dominance in cooperative games.
Let (x (1) ; x (2) ; :::; x (n) ) be the vector obtained from x 2 R n by ordering its components in decreasing order: x (1) x (2) ::: x (n) .
In the sequel, we use the following equivalent de…nition of Lorenz dominance:
for each k = 1; 2; :::; n; with at least one strict inequality.
Lemma 1
The vector a = 1 n a Lorenz dominates each other element of the set fx 2 R n j P n i=1 x i = na > 0g; where 1 n represents the vector whose n coordinates are equal to 1.
Proof. Let us consider x 6 = a. It is obvious that a = a (1) < x (1) . Let us assume that ka P k i=1 x (i) . Now, we are going to prove that (k + 1)a P k+1 i=1 x (i) . Let us suppose on the contrary that (k + 1)a > P k+1 i=1 x (i) . This implies that P n i=k+2 x (i) > (n k 1)a. Therefore, there exists an i > k + 1 such that x (i ) > a. On the other hand, we have
Hence, we obtain x (k+1) < a. Further, since i > k + 1 implies x (k+1) x (i ) , we have a > x (k+1) x (i ) > a. Therefore, the result holds.
Lemma 2 The vector a = 1 n a satis…es (1) for each other element of the set fx 2 R n j P n i=1 x i nag:
Proof. Let us consider x (1) x (2) :::
(n) and
Thus, applying Lemma 1 we obtain the desired result.
Proposition 1
The vector a = (1 n 1 a 1 ; 1 n 2 a 2 ; :::; 1 nt a t ), such that a 1 a 2 ::: a t > 0 and P t i=1 n i = n; Lorenz dominates each other element of the set
x i = n 2 a 2 ; :::;
Proof. Let us consider x 6 = a and the vector obtained from vector x by rearranging in decreasing order the elements inside each block displayed in (2): (x (1;1) ; :::; x (1;n 1 ) ; x (2;1) ; :::; x (2;n 2 ) ; :::; x (t;1) ; :::; x (t;nt) ) with
::: x (2;n 2 ) :::
::: x (t;nt) :
By Lemma 1 we know that for each block i = 1; 2; :::; t we have
x (i;j) for each k = 1; 2; :::; n i ,
and at least one inequality is strict, where x (i;j) is the j-th element in the decreasing order within the i-th block of vector x. Now, we are going to prove that x is Lorenz dominated by a. For each k, 1 k n, we have
for some r t, n 0 = 0 and 0 r(k) n r+1 . Then,
where the …rst inequality follows from the decreasing order inside each block, the second inequality follows from (3) and the equality from the de…nition of a. Note that we use the alternative notations for ordered vectors a ( ) and a ( ; ) ; where the former refers to blocks and the latter to the elements inside each block. Now, since x 6 = a there exists a block q and an l-th coordinate inside of it such that P l j=1 a q < P l j=1 x (q;j) . Takek =
where the strict inequality follows from (3) and the above comment. Therefore, the result holds.
Lemma 3
The vector a = (1 n 1 a 1 ; 1 n 2 a 2 ; :::; 1 nt a t ), such that a 1 a 2 ::: a t > 0 and P t i=1 n i = n; satis…es (1) for each other element of the set
x i n 2 a 2 ; :::;
Proof. The proof can be derived straightforwardly taking into account Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.
Proposition 2
The vector a = (1 n 1 a 1 ; 1 n 2 a 2 ; :::; 1 nt a t ), where a 1 a 2 ::: a t > 0 and P t i=1 n i = n; Lorenz dominates each other element x 2 R n such that
n i a i ; :::;
Proof. Let us consider x 6 = a. If for this vector x every inequality in (4) is an equality, then applying Proposition 1 we obtain the result. Therefore, let us suppose that at least one inequality in (4) is strict. In this case, there exist r < s t such that
x (r;j) > n r a r and ns X j=1
x (s;j) < n s a s .
For the r-th block, by applying an analogous argument as in Lemma 1, we obtain that P k j=1 a r P k j=1 x (r;j) for each k = 1; :::; n r and at least one inequality is strict (for example the last one). Let s be the …rst block for which P ns j=1 x (s;j) < n s a s . Now, we consider the vector (x Applying Proposition 1 we obtain
for each k n 1 + n 2 + ::: + n s 1 , with at least one strict inequality. In particular, we have
; then, from the de…ni-tion of the set (4), we obtain
Now, we take x (s;1) , which is a largest element of block s, and distinguish between two cases: B a s x (s;1) > 0. We construct a new decreasing ordered vector x 00 using the …rst n 1 + n 2 + ::: + n s 1 coordinates of vector x and x (s;1) ; that is x 00 (1)
::: x 00 (n 1 +n 2 +:::+n s 1 +1) :
8
We have
On the other hand, we have
Therefore, we obtain
x (s;1) a s . The proof of this case is straightforward.
At this point, we can do the same for each other element in the s-th block and we obtain a new decreasing ordered vector with the …rst n 1 + n 2 + ::: + n s 1 + n s coordinates of vector x. Repeating the reasoning for each block p such that P np j=1 x (p;j) < n p a p , we can conclude that a Lorenz dominates each other element x of the set (4).
Some remarks on the Lorenz dominance
We shall start this section with considerations upon the constrained egalitarian solution. Theorem 3 in Dutta and Ray (1989) states that CES(N; v) Lorenz dominates every allocation in C(N; v) for convex games, however, in its proof nothing about convexity is mentioned. Therefore, one could understand that this result is also true in other situations. Furthermore, a "rich-to-poor"transfer reasoning is used for proving that CES(N; v) Lorenz dominated every allocation in C(N; v). In our opinion, this "rich-to-poor" reasoning, although intuitively clear, is little precise from a mathematical point of view.
Next using the technical results in Section 4, we provide an alternative and more general proof for Theorem 3 in Dutta and Ray (1989) . Proof. Let x 2 C(N; v) such that x 6 = DR(N; v). Since for all k = 1; 2; :::; K, x(S k ) v(S k ), two cases are possible:
x(S k ) = v(S k ) for all k = 1; 2; :::; K. Then, it is easy to check that we are in the conditions of Proposition 1; hence, DR(N; v) Lorenz dominates x.
x(S k ) > v(S k ) for some k = 1; 2; :::; K. Then it is easy to check that we are in the conditions of Proposition 2; hence, DR(N; v) Lorenz dominates x.
Therefore, the proof is …nished. Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1.
On the other hand, in superadditive games we have that DR(N; v) ESOS(N; v) EDC(N; v) I(N; v). Thus, if a society believes that a "fair"allocation should be in the imputation set and the Lorenz criterion is a good concept of inequality, then the core would be in trouble many times. If the coalitional rationality is included as other desirable criterion, then the ideas and results in Arin and Inarra (2001) would be very useful.
A simple algorithm to obtain an allocation in the imputation set which Lorenz dominates each other allocation in the imputation set is the following:
Step 1: Let S 1 = fi 2 N : v(i) Step k: Let us assume that S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k 1 have been de…ned recursively and S k 1 j=1 S j 6 = N . Let S k = fi 2 N n
If S k 6 = ; then de…ne x i = v(i) for all i 2 S k , otherwise
